Review of Simon Kirchin\u27s  Reading Parfit On What Matters by Ross, Steve
© 2018 Ross. This open access article is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
ISSN 1526-0569 | Essays in Philosophy is published by the Pacific University Libraries
Book Review
Reading Parfit On What Matters
Volume 19, Issue 2 (2018)
Simon Kirchin, Editor, Routledge, Oxford, 2017, 236 pages
Steven Ross
Essays Philos (2018)19:2  |  DOI:  10.7710/1526-0569. 1617
Correspondence:  sonokal@earthlink.net
Essays in Philosophy
Hunter College and Graduate Center/ CUNY 
Volume 19, Issue 2Essays in Philosophy
2 | eP1617 Essays in Philosophy
It is not easy to give a straightforward assessment of this collection. We have about a 
dozen essays, of varying quality and originality, and commentary on these arguments, 
at the end, by Parfit himself. Sometimes the arguments are interesting and novel, some-
times they quite artificial and dull. And so, moving, as Parfit himself does, from talk of 
“values” to talk of “reasons,” it is then also hard, at least for me, to say how good the rea-
sons to read this book are. But I do not think my difficulty on offering a decisive verdict 
here reflects anything unusual about me. As I will try to show in the essay below, the 
collection very much reflects certain pervasive features of meta ethics today, and these 
features - the needlessly technical language, an essentialist conception of the object of 
analysis (“the good”), and a distaste for connecting talk of value to everyday experience 
- often makes for hard reading. In addition, of course, the difficulty of assessing this col-
lection just reflects a natural problem in meta-ethics, and so what is also a central theme 
of Parfit’s: the objectivity of normative judgments, and the elusive connection between 
what is good and how we feel.
In what follows I will do the following. I will say something about the collection gener-
ally, its focus and its tone, where it is rewarding, where frustrating. I will also say some-
thing about some of the particular papers found therein, enough at least so readers have 
some idea as to what they can find there. I then want to offer an extended discussion 
of some of the issues that are raised in this collection. There is first the question of how 
to understand the relation between the normative and the natural; indeed, whether the 
normative might just be the natural. Of course, different philosophers will always have 
strong conflicting intuitions on this issue, and we should not wish it otherwise. But I will 
also argue that once certain assumptions that typically frame this issue are set aside, we 
may be able to find more room for agreement than is typically acknowledged. And so, in 
offering an account of what I think the right natural – normative relation is, I will also 
be offering what one might call a “conciliatory” account that seeks to widen agreement 
among all who take part in this debate. I will then offer some remarks on the varied 
objectivity of normative judgments and how this connects to “what matters.” I believe 
these two topics are more closely related than is often appreciated, for the reasons that 
count against a strong natural – normative identification also bear upon the how best to 
understand the objectivity of normative judgments, and why what matters – does. 
The collection overall
Two features stand out. First, the essays here very much reflect an increasingly com-
mon, and to this reader, unfortunate, way of pursuing philosophy today. The language 
is often fussy, the framework of analysis needlessly technical. Constructed abbreviations 
abound. Remarks like “I will introduce the term ‘way of thinking,’ or ‘WOT’” (41); “We 
label it ‘(O)’ because it is, in H.A. Pritchard’s sense, an objective view of ought.” (111) are, 
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wearyingly, everywhere. You would think Parfit had offered the world a thesis in modal 
logic or a treatise on recent economic trends in the industrialized West rather than, as his 
title has it, on what matters (in life, presumably). It is not, on the whole, very gratifying 
reading. There are exceptions, of course, or, passages in some of these essays where this 
is not so to an oppressive degree. But the reader who hopes for an expansive, elegant, 
thoughtful essay on what matters, on objectivity, will on the whole be quite disappointed. 
What we typically get instead are endless remarks about the reciprocal implication rela-
tions between near alike sentences and coy reflections on small matters. The following 
serve as perfectly good illustrations. 
“As it stands however this is no argument for the normative status of second 
personal demands – rather it seems to presuppose it: given that we do make 
normatively authoritative demands, we must already be in the appropriate 
relationship. And there is a further difficulty. In the unlikely case above, in 
which I am treading on one stranger’s foot to prevent others from treading 
on further strangers’ feet, why does my “relationship” with the first stranger 
take precedence over my “relationships” with those strangers whose feet I am 
protecting? Given Darwall’s emphasis above on the demand that the treader 
“stop causing you pain,” perhaps the idea is that it is the direct causal nature 
of my relationship to the pain of the stranger on whose foot I am treading 
that accounts for this. But of course, we need to be told what counts as direct 
causation and why it makes a difference.” 
David McNaughton and Piers Rawling, “Normativity, Reasons and Wrongness,” (110)
“The assumption we have suggested that Parfit seems to need in order for the 
non-normativity of (Q) [the claim that “what is best” will have natural properties 
too] and sentences like it to pose a problem for the NAN [non-analytic naturalist] 
is the assumption that the only way the proposition (Q) expresses could explain 
the informativeness of C [the act which maximizes happiness is what we ought 
to do] is by being the same proposition (C) expresses. This would mean that 
(C), despite appearances, doesn’t express a normative proposition, as the NAN 
requires.  But, as we shall argue, there are reasons quite independent of what is 
at issue between the NAN and the non-naturalist for rejecting this assumption. 
If we allow that (Q) semantically expresses the proposition that (C) may be used 
to pragmatically communicate, then we may explain the informativeness of a 
use of (C) with (Q), while allowing that the proposition (C) expresses in virtue 
of its semantics is a normative proposition for just the reason Parfit allows: it is 
stated using a piece of normative vocabulary – namely NORM.” 
Volume 19, Issue 2Essays in Philosophy
4 | eP1617 Essays in Philosophy
J.L. Dowell and David Sobel, “Advice for Non-Analytic Naturalists,” (161)
One reads these passages and thinks: Aha! So this is what matters.
Secondly, on the other side of the ledger as it were, as I mentioned earlier, this collec-
tion includes responses by Parfit to each of the essays. Unsurprisingly, Parfit is more 
intrigued by what some of these writers have to say about his work than by others, and 
his responses – in detail and in care – vary a lot. Before Philip Stratton-Lake on what is 
called “the buck passing account of value” for example, he has literally nothing to say, 
writing only that he is “convinced by all the arguments.” But that is the rare case. On the 
whole, having Parfit’s comments on the paper as well as the paper itself makes this a far 
better book than it would be otherwise. Sometimes Parfit does little more than explain 
why he thinks his critic gets him wrong (valuable in its way, to be sure). But sometimes 
there is genuine give and take in the commentary (see his response to David Copp and 
Julia Markovitz for example), and the reader gets a richer, more expanded sense of the 
issue in question as a result. 
The essays
And now, a few moderately summary remarks about some of the essays themselves. 
In the opening essay, “Reflections on Wolf and Wood,” Simon Kirchin takes up not Parfit, 
but the criticisms Susan Woolf and Allen Wood made of Parfit when On What Matters 
first came out. That Kirchin is summarizing and commenting on previous commentary 
gives this essay a particularly detached and lifeless air. For example, we get a recapitula-
tion of Wolf ’s worries about incommensurability, sort of, in Kirchin’s words, but not 
much original discussion of the subject itself. To be told that value incommensurability 
is “seemingly real” and as such “makes trouble for Parfit” is not to be told very much. 
(17) And Parfit, for his part, really seems to think the idea of incommensurability can be 
captured in ideas like indeterminacy or imprecision (189 – 190). Since these are ideas he 
has long acknowledged to be a part of the moral landscape, he cannot for the life of him 
see what the problem for his view might be (he is “puzzled”). Apart from discovering 
how constrained a conception of value incommensurability Parfit has, understanding it 
as he does within a consequentialist conception that already denies it, as it were, there is 
little to be found here. 
In “On What It Is To Matter” Julia Markovitz takes up Parfit’s “objectivism” regarding 
reasons and his rejection of a subjectivist analysis of how something comes to be a rea-
son – roughly, simply in virtue of a desire we happen to have. (55) This is a much vexed 
topic, with many offshoots, and on the whole Markovitz’s handles the subject, and the 
objectivist/subjectivist debate, with admirable clarity. Markovitz points out that while 
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Parfit is often conciliatory in On What Matters, seeking common ground among ap-
parently opposing theories, in his view of reasons, Parfit finds his opponent’s position 
wholly unsatisfactory, close to a kind of nihilism (a criticism we will see again, with re-
spect to a certain view of normative-natural identity). On the objectivist picture (Parfit 
writes), “goodness would give us reasons ‘because it is out there, shining down.’” But if 
subjectivism is true, “we must make our choices in the dark.” (55) Since according to 
subjectivism, all our reasons depend on desires we can in turn have no reason to have, 
subjectivism entails a nihilistic picture of the normative world, whether its proponents 
see it that way or not. (55) 
As Markovitz quite rightly points out, the disagreement between objectivists and subjec-
tivists is not about “what matters”; it is rather about what it is for something to matter. 
According to subjectivists, things matter because they matter to us. Sentient creatures 
introduce reasons into the world by caring. We find it bad to die an early death; this is 
something we very much want to avoid. According to the objectivist, things matter to 
us, when we are reasoning well, because they matter. People want to avoid an early death 
because such death is a bad thing. (58) 
To take up this issue is to walk down a very familiar road. Indeed, the reader cannot help 
but be struck by how much the discussion framework remains as it was when Bernard 
Williams first offered his anti-objectivist reading of reasons nearly fifty years ago. And 
most of the familiar considerations are taken up. Desires, and so reasons, can arise, or 
emerge, simply from reasoning about one’s present desires. Some desires may be desires 
we have no reason to have. We may have reasons we are not aware of; conversely, we 
may act on what we think are reasons, but in fact fail to be reasons at all. Markovitz goes 
over all this territory patiently,  at every point trying to show the subjectivist is not re-
ally in so bad a position as Parfit thinks (61 – 69), and on the whole, she gives credible 
pushback, a good account of things from the subjectivist point of view. However, what is 
to me the most worthwhile point is not developed, not pursued, nearly as much I would 
have wished. Markovitz notes that objectivists like Parfit offer a rather surprising story of 
what it is for a reason to be objective when we act just to satisfy some desire. Anxious to 
say our reasons are always grounded in facts independent of desires, the objectivist will 
say that we have desire-based reasons (like wanting a drink when thirsty) only because 
we have a more fundamental reason that is desire-independent: a reason to promote 
our well being, or provide pleasure, or avoid frustration, and so forth (60). (Scanlon, a 
similar objectivist about reasons, says more or less exactly the same thing in his Being 
Realistic About Reasons.) It is the fact of our liking so and so that gives us the reason, to 
do it or to have it; the desire is not the reason, rather it responds to this objective fact, or 
tracks it, and objectivism is saved.
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Markovitz notes the idiosyncrasy of the position. After all, it is the actual experience 
of liking this stuff rather than that that “fills in” the general fact that I have reason to 
do what I like with a reason to do this act rather than that, in a particular case. (60) So: 
maybe I do have reason to eat chocolate because of “the fact that” it will satisfy a desire 
I presently have. But that it is chocolate I want, or have a reason to grasp, can only be 
because of my contingent subjective predilections. The mild artificiality of the position 
noted, she then moves on. What has not been noticed is that one very important idea be-
hind the objectivist project in the normative context has been given up in order to have 
a more formal, less substantive, conception of objectivism instead. I will explain. 
Let me elaborate on this by introducing an argument of my own. Recall Thomas Nagel’s 
very early, and very important, contribution to this debate in The Possibility of Altruism, 
where he argued persuasively that one had a reason to act on behalf of one’s future self 
regardless of how one felt, subjectively, about that future self. The reality of that future 
self was sufficient to give one a reason. If I am to be in Antarctica in a few days, I have a 
reason to get a good parka now, regardless of how I feel. Analogously Nagel thought we 
had reason to take the well being of others into account regardless of how we felt, sub-
jectively, simply because others were equally real. It is not important that we assess this 
argument. The main point here is: “objectivity” of reasons here meant indifference to 
subjective states. You have a reason not to hurt another regardless of your subjective 
state. Or we can put it this way: regardless of any counter-factual concerning that subjec-
tive state you like, you still have a reason to take the well being of others into account (if 
one grants this argument). Now, however, before the act that satisfies a desire, the objec-
tivist (perhaps “so-called objectivist” is more like it) can say nothing of the sort. I have a 
reason to eat ice cream (or smoke marijuana) only if I have the desire to do so, or enjoy it 
when I have done so. The objectivity is now “grammatical.” There is a description of lik-
ing and satisfaction that is presented in the garb of facts – and that is fine, as far as it goes. 
After all, it is “true that,” it is a fact that, if I want X, then, when I get X, I will be pleased, 
not be frustrated, have a preference satisfied, whatever. And so it is certainly possible to 
cloak this desire satisfaction story in some kind of fact talk. But now we have simply set 
aside, or have forgotten, the initial aspiration behind the objectivist argument in the first 
place. We want to say, centrally in certain moral contexts, that persons have a reason to 
do X – some specific X – regardless of how they feel. Now (in this desire based context) 
that is impossible. I have no reason at all to eat ice cream unless I enjoy it, or would en-
joy it if I were to have it. Giving an “objective” account of that desire, or that reason, just 
covers up what is an important asymmetry. This is not to say objectivism about reasons 
is wrong. I do not think it is at all. It is only to point out that a determination to offer a 
unified, essentialist account of reasons leads to philosophical artificiality. The reason I 
have not to hit an innocent pedestrian while driving and my reason to eat ice cream are 
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not going to admit of the same sort of analysis, not at all. One does, and one does not, 
survive counter-factuals about the agent’s subjective states. I don’t think this is a terribly 
disruptive point to acknowledge. It does mean one must set aside a kind of pointless “es-
sentialism.” There is not going some single true account that fits all cases of reasons. It 
seems very artificial (to me at least) to try and resist this point and I cannot see the philo-
sophical point of doing so. But it is just this that is the problem. It is this determination to 
force the account that is plausible before one’s future self, or the well being of others, on 
to the pure desire based context that causes the difficulty. The objectivist should concede 
what is so about the reasons that are tied to desires, or certain kinds of desires, and offer 
a partial theory. For it is only sometimes true that the reasons we have will have nothing 
to do with how we feel.
This general point, or problem, as we will see, will come up again. Meta-ethics today 
is gripped by, or pursued via, a strange and to me wholly unwarranted essentialism. 
Claims about “the normative” or about “reasons” are offered as true of the whole genus, 
the whole category, and important differences within the category are ignored. Indeed, 
whether we really have a stable category to begin with is never taken up, and it is not 
at all obvious that this can be assumed. After all, it is a familiar platitude to us now that 
while “art” is a meaningful term, it is unlikely that there are many informative general-
izations to be had about the members of this class. I believe it is almost certainly true that 
the same can be said of “the normative.” The justified use of normative talk before things 
as various as bits of nature, novels, jokes, cooperative social systems, pain, and whiskey 
(and the list really does go on and on) suggests to me at least that we have something 
more like a Wittgensteinian “family resemblance” class than one in which the members 
are linked by some relatively clear set of criteria. At the least, I think it is striking fact 
about contemporary meta-ethics that this threshold issue is never taken up, (and I mean: 
never taken up), something that would have been unimaginable in an earlier philosophi-
cal era. I will return to this point, to this challenge, later, when discussing the normative 
and the natural. Here, on the issue of reasons, let me just observe, again, that perhaps 
a great deal of the difficulty, or the antagonism between the objectivist and subjectivist 
analysis, could disappear if we would just divide the domain of reasons, of what there is 
to be analyzed, accordingly. 
Julia Driver’s “Contingency and Constructivism” takes up what is unquestionably an 
interesting project: can we make sense of “reasons that matter” in a more naturalistic, 
Humean way than Parfit allows? Before taking this up, she sketches the ways in which we 
might be motivated to do this to begin with because of the prima facie difficulties an ap-
proach like Parfit’s seems to have. But here, when considering her criticisms, the reader 
really must to turn to Parfit’s response at the same time as well. Parfit is surely right to say 
his view of irreducibly normative truths does not commit him to any spooky ontology 
Volume 19, Issue 2Essays in Philosophy
8 | eP1617 Essays in Philosophy
(232), as Driver suggests (172). And he is also right to resist being tied to understanding 
such truths in exactly the way we would characterize mathematical claims (232, 233). 
Parfit points out that just because “he cannot imagine” how some of these claims could 
possibly be otherwise (the inevitable “torturing people for fun is wrong” is trotted out 
as a paradigm example), this does not mean he is looking for anything like “bedrock.” 
Surely he can treat these irreducibly normative, undeniably true, claims as web like, mu-
tually supporting. Why not? But Driver is, as she says, mostly interested in sketching an 
attractive alternative to Parfit, and so the degree to which her criticisms of Parfit might 
be casual or off the mark can be acknowledged and set aside.
I always approach arguments like Driver’s with the following thought: if as a Humean, 
you really are going to try to show how morality could be constructed, the Kantian con-
structivist argument would clearly seem to be the one to beat. By assuming the equality 
of persons, and thinking of parties in a position of fairness attempting to reach agree-
ment, the Kantian has a nice clear way to explain: 1) why we would wind up with the 
particular rules we would wind up with, and 2) why those rules would have authority, 
or, admit of a good justification. But OK, that is the Kantian version; let’s have an open 
mind. Let’s see how the Humean can do this too, relying not on claims about persons and 
reasonable agreement, but instead on sentiments. 
However, when Driver lays out her Humean constructivism, there is just too much easy 
going vagueness. There is no account of how the Humean picture would generate specif-
ic moral content distinct from our starting points, or claim authority for whatever judg-
ments we do wind up with. We are told that while judgments of vice and virtue “are not 
picking up on anything out there in the world” (of course), at the same time, “our senti-
ments cannot regulate just willy nilly” (178). Somehow, we are able to correct our biases, 
we “abstract away” from our “idiosyncratic features of personality,” (is this something 
we learn to do in yoga?) not (again, of course) by reference to any objective consider-
ations we can point to apart from our affective reactions, but out of a need “to effectively 
communicate with one another” (179).  It is the need for social intercourse that forces 
us all into a kind of linga franca, that nudges us away from the distinctive limitations of 
our own particular point of view. Through social intercourse, we are able to reach “calm 
judgments concerning the character of men” (the language here is Hume’s) (179)
As I say, what the content of these judgments should be is never taken up. It is not even 
noticed that this should be taken up. There is all the usual talk of “correcting biases” from 
the standpoint of an “ideal agent,” but we never get our hands dirty with what the unbi-
ased response would find, or feel, or detect, or what have you. So, to give some examples: 
do we “find that,” when looking at one another in this “unbiased” way, that property is 
rightly subject to taxation so the poor may have something closer to equal opportunity? 
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Do we “find that” women have the right to vote? Do we “find that” some spheres of free-
dom will be respected even if abrogating them would promote more utility?  There is talk 
– there always is – of “properly reflecting” on the quality of one’s mental states (181) and 
how certain desires (in this case, Caligula’s) “cannot withstand endorsement of the right 
sort” (181), but the coy, suggestive talk never goes any further; we never get a theory of 
what it would be to do this right, or not, to endorse correctly, or not. It is as if we could 
do moral philosophy by staying forever on the level of first order talk, the language of 
etiquette, of what is and is not “done.” But that just will not do, you see. We need to know 
more, and we need to know why. 
I turn finally to David Copp’s “Normative Naturalism and Normative Nihilism: Parfit’s 
dilemma for naturalism.” This is I think one of the better essays in the collection. It is 
certainly one of the more straightforward, and it has the further virtue of being tied to 
an issue of undeniable centrality. One of Parfit’s signature claims in On What Matters is 
that naturalism about the normative is fundamentally self defeating as it were; we cannot 
really affirm there is value, if we think of value as a (mere) natural property. Copp thinks 
this argument is important – the naturalist must meet it – but it is too quick. The natural-
ist can be a naturalist and still make sense of the evaluative; we just need to make a few 
helpful philosophical distinctions in how we think, and how we talk, in order to do so. 
First a bit more on why Parfit thinks this about naturalism to begin with. Parfit begins by 
distinguishing between what he calls “hard naturalism” and “soft”: hard naturalism is a 
kind of eliminativism; of course there are normative concepts, but there are no normative 
properties or states of affairs, only natural ones. Thus we have no reason to use norma-
tive language in making normative claims; all such claims can be made with natural lan-
guage. A “soft naturalist” holds while we could use only natural language in talking about 
what there is in the world, we “have good reason” all the same to use normative language. 
But Parfit thinks this second claim, the position of the soft naturalist, is fundamentally 
unstable. There “can be good reason” to use such language only if there are facts that can-
not be expressed in natural language. And it is precisely this that naturalism must deny. 
So, soft naturalism too must also be a kind of eliminativism. In any event, it cannot re-
ally hold onto the intuition (the intuition that is in fact correct) that there is good reason 
to use normative talk. Hence Parfit’s famous claim “naturalism is close to nihilism.” As 
Copp puts it, on Parfit’s view, the naturalist must hold that normative concepts could be 
removed “without cognitive loss.” (30) And that is to say, the naturalist must hold there 
is no normative at all, that normativity “is an illusion.” (28)
Neither Copp nor Parfit put it this way, but I think it is helpful to frame this as a dilemma 
framed around the question of autonomy. Do normative concepts name a domain that 
is autonomous with respect to natural facts? If they do, if the normative is autonomous 
Volume 19, Issue 2Essays in Philosophy
10 | eP1617 Essays in Philosophy
with respect to the natural, then, if naturalism is understood as a denial of that claim, 
naturalism, or this strand of the argument, cannot be right. If the normative is not auton-
omous with respect to the natural, then it must be swallowed up by it, and then it must 
also be true that normativity does not really exist. Like “the religious” on some views, 
what was once solid melts into air, when touched by naturalistic analysis.  
For Copp, the right approach is what he calls a “bold” rather than “eliminativist” strategy 
(32). Here we affirm the existence of normative properties – we do not deny “the norma-
tive” – but hold “all normative properties are [also] natural properties.” (32) However, 
obviously, for this strategy to work, the naturalist must be able to say what it is for a 
property to be “normative,” what a normative property is. Otherwise the naturalist can’t 
begin to say how, in addition, that property is (also) natural. And now things get more 
interesting than either Copp or Parfit seem to realize. Copp offers a conception of “nor-
mativity” that is in fact wildly selective and, even its own domain, artificial and incom-
plete – and seems not to notice any of this. Normative facts Copp says are “grounded 
in” “solutions” to certain “generic problems” faced by “human beings” in “their ordinary 
lives.” (32-33) So, for example, there is the problem of social cooperation. We do better 
if we can live together, and plainly “widespread subscription to a moral code” can help 
us do just that. Thus, “morality is the solution to the problem of equipping people to 
live comfortably and successfully together in societies.” (33) “Moral truth” is a function 
of whatever “system of norms … would do most to ameliorate the relevant problem of 
normative governance.” 
A few points of comment before returning to this fantasy land. In the first place, it seems 
obvious that much normative life has absolutely nothing to do with any of this what-
soever. It is an interesting, and on the whole depressing, feature both of Parfit and his 
many commentators that, while claiming to offer a treatise on “the normative” as such, 
in fact, we get nothing of the kind. Oh, we get a lot of discussion of “the badness of pain” 
(necessary, to be sure, and so true in all possible worlds) and a little about how “torturing 
people for fun is wrong” (I will have more to say about both of these so called normative 
claims below), but there is absolutely nothing about aesthetic or literary or other cultural 
accomplishments. When I call De Kooning “original” or Lenny Bruce “witty” or the 
Waldstein “expressive” or Henry James “imaginative” surely I am expressing a normative 
judgment. Surely these are central cases of “the normative.” But if that is so, you would 
never know it from the literature that is out there. And the aesthetic case is important 
when thinking about “the normative” for several reasons actually. First, it is an interest-
ing case where our emotional life is often undeniably centrally implicated. It is hard to see 
how the objects I have mentioned here would have the resonance that they do for us, and 
so bear the ascriptions I have offered, if we did not have the emotional engagement with 
these objects that we do. Second, connected to this last point, while objectivity is avail-
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able, to some extent, maybe, the aesthetic also offers a rich warning to those who would 
assume well justified judgments cannot be challenged, that there will not be deep and 
enduring “sensibility-relativity” all the same. And finally, the aesthetic also offers a case 
where it is often very tricky, usually just plain foolhardy, to offer a pre-existing teleology 
and then point to the evaluated object (the art object) as good because it offers a “solu-
tion” to the well defined problem posed by that teleology. That’s not what makes Madam 
Bovary a better novel than A Tale of Two Cities. And yet, and yet, these undeniable points 
not withstanding, we have in this idea of “the solution” to certain “generic” problems of 
“human cooperation” the normative. Truly, meta-ethics is in an unbelievable state. 
But wait, there’s more. Even if we forget how selective a theory this is, how much is left 
out or willfully ignored, even if we stay only within the specific domain it speaks to, it 
is woefully under described. So, these “humans” Copp waves at so vaguely: are they to 
be considered equally entitled to consideration, regardless of gender or race or property 
ownership? If so, surely this is not the natural or default posture of societies (of “hu-
mans”) in the past. We need a theory (of persons, of citizenship) telling us what counts 
and why. Is apartheid a “solution” to the problem of living together? Many Afrikan-
ers thought so. Must women have the vote? (That tiresome example again.) Do same 
sex couples have the right to marry? The answers to these questions hardly follow from 
some bland talk about “social cooperation” and “generic human need.” It is obvious that 
similar points can be made about normative assessments of e.g. abortion, or affirmative 
action, or libertarian conceptions of equal opportunity. The various answers on offer 
here are all compatible with “social cooperation” – clearly, since stable societies have 
embraced all possible positions with respect to these matters. From that it hardly follows 
they are all, normatively, on a par. 
All right, now we are back. Now the subject before us, again, is whether the naturalist can 
be a naturalist and not fall afoul of the wrong sort of eliminativism. First, Copp meets the 
right threshold requirement: he has said (allegedly) what the normative is; a circle has 
been drawn around it. Now, we distinguish between “worldly facts” and “propositional 
facts.” When I say “water is H20”  I refer to the same fact in the world (or worldly fact) 
twice over. But “water is water” and “water is H20” name different propositions. All the 
naturalist has to do to meet the eliminativist worry is to insist that there will be “different 
ways” of thinking about a normative state of affairs, or, what is the same thing, different 
propositions picking it out. As a result, there will be non-natural normative properties in 
this propositional rather than worldly way. So, even if “wrongness” (a normative prop-
erty) is always and everywhere identical to “undermining the general welfare” (a natu-
ral one) in a “worldly” way (these sentences always and everywhere pick out the same 
worldly fact) clearly, a person could believe an action is wrong without believing that 
action will undermine the general welfare, and vice-versa. (35) Thus we can make sense 
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of strong identity between the natural and the normative, and, at the same time, how it is 
that the disappearance of the normative would constitute (to use Copp’s strange term) a 
“cognitive loss.” Belief that “this act is wrong” is not the same, does not pick out the same 
“propositional fact,” as the belief that “this act diminishes the general welfare.” Identity 
and yet autonomy are together delivered – where it is the latter that guarantees that the 
naturalist is no “nihilist” after all. 
When we turn to Parfit’s response, it turns out these two have nothing to fight about 
after all. The only naturalist that Parfit thinks courts nihilism is one who thinks there 
are no non natural normative facts. But, Parfit shrewdly observes, this cannot be Copp’s 
view. Once we understand “fact” in this more relaxed way to include propositional facts, 
“facts” which raise no ontological difficulty, it is clear Copp must hold there are non-
natural normative facts. (198-199) What else could be the objects of our (autonomous) 
normative beliefs? What else could we be picking out when using these propositions? 
Amazingly, it turns out that so long as one thinks this talk of propositional facts car-
ries any philosophical weight, conceptual non identity will be enough to give us all the 
nihilism-resisting platitudes regarding naturalism and reduction we could wish.
My own view is that more interesting issues lie just beyond this framework. Let me begin 
by noting that nowhere in this discussion do we see the question of normative/natural 
identity taken up via the type/token distinction. This may seem a bit of philistinism on 
my part. After all, if Copp and Parfit are going to assume the possibility of type-type 
identity (between e.g. “wrong” and “undermining the general welfare”), and still find a 
domain of non-natural normative facts, doesn’t that make the weaker mere token iden-
tity irrelevant? I do not think so at all. It is the implausibility of type identity that explains 
why there would be “cognitive loss” were we to jettison the normative. Parfit, and Copp, 
may think that by imagining “worldly” identity as type – type, what survives under that 
analysis as “normatively independent” will have all the autonomy one could ask for. But I 
think this is very much not so. This domain of propositional facts, this talk of “cognitive 
loss,” is consistent with a very meager conception of the normative, or with anything else 
for that matter. 
Consider the counterpart point when recast in the context of belief in supernatural spir-
its (let us assume such belief is widespread, that all the world is Haiti). So suppose that 
1) someone believes that the spirit Ahura has put a curse on her, and 2) “Ahura” is in fact 
strongly type – type identical with a neural state N that is typically, reliably, induced by 
the local shaman. The spiritual S is the natural N in terms of worldly facts, but so what? 
We would, given the independence of propositional facts, still have, consistent with this 
identity claim, a realm of autonomous non natural spiritual facts. For surely, if those 
who spoke of “Ahura’s wrath” were forced to employ the natural kind term instead, there 
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would be “cognitive loss.” But what in Heaven’s name can that show? Not that there is 
any “Ahura fact”! Except of course in this pointless or trivial sense of propositional fact. 
These distinctions of ontological kind, or between that which has causal-ontological im-
plications and that which does not, show nothing about the character of the particular 
domain before us; in particular, it can show nothing about whether the use of any such 
autonomous concepts is justified. It is not enough, it cannot be enough, to show some 
conceptual scheme picks out its own counterpart “autonomous” facts, facts, when real-
ized in the world, are invariably coextensive with some “worldly” or natural fact. We get 
that much in the vengeful spirits case. We must ask whether the use and deployment of 
this conceptual scheme, or some part of it, is justified. And here, before this question of 
justification, whether or not type-type identity is plausible is of the first importance, be-
cause the reasons why such identity is not plausible are crucial to getting the normative 
right, to why the sort of skepticism appropriate before a Voodoo god can get no foothold 
here. Obviously, the justification for my claim that Henry James is insightful can never lie 
in offering a natural description. I am not making a natural causation or “supervenience” 
claim. If that is so, then any talk of type-type identity cannot be right. The autonomy of 
the normative lies in the distinctive use of normative language. Typically, we use norma-
tive language not to pick out some “property,” but to point to some accomplishment.
I now return to the earlier anti-essentialist complaint. It is a remarkable feature of meta 
ethics today that it is taken for granted that “the normative” names a more or less stable 
category before which generalizations are just waiting there for the making. But I am 
very much not so sure. I am not sure that “original” when said of works of art and “just” 
when said of the basic structure of society and “good” when said of single malt scotch 
and the “bad” when said of pain are all helpfully captured in some single rubric, let it be 
any rubric you like. I for one would not at all mind if we dropped this obsessive essential-
ism and at least flirted once in a while with talk of “family resemblances.” But setting that 
aside, I do think it is fair to say of some subgroup of normative concepts that they name, 
centrally, accomplishments. When I say the remark was clever, the novel original, the ar-
gument insightful, I say these things managed to achieve some sort of accomplishment. 
And it seems obvious in these sorts of cases that any sort of type type identity between 
the accomplishment term and whatever the natural states of affairs that here bears it is 
ridiculous. How could there possibly be type type identity between “expressive” when 
applied to art works, or “clever” when applied to architectural designs, and some natural 
or material predicate? The intent to accomplish or bring about some end can seize on 
a variety of possible means. Much as I can make a tool with a rock or with a branch, I 
can make a clever remark about Margaret Thatcher with a variety of different words, or 
paint a somber seascape using a variety of materially distinct painterly media. Of course 
every expressive painting is token identical with some material predicate or other. But so 
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what? No one thinks there is any way into the idea of “the expressive” via the disjunction 
of whatever token identity claims have also been true with each separate (correct) use of 
the term.  And so, type – type identity between “the normative” (or at least this species 
of it, that which speaks of accomplishments) and “the natural” is not a plausible thought 
from the start. These collective interests, as kinds, are autonomous with respect to physi-
cal kinds. They name interests that shape the world, (we make the expressive painting or 
the clever remark); they are not things caused by it. This point is so fundamental to what 
norms are that if we treat it casually – “oh let’s just assume there might be type – type 
identity here and see what the independence of the normative might come to then” – we 
are bound to wind up with a woefully artificial version of the normative when we are 
finished. 
And so it is here. Parfit thinks strict identity must be rejected because it leads to “nihil-
ism.” The normative would “disappear” were we to assimilate it, strictly, to a natural kind. 
I think this is true, but why not take up why it is true? As it stands, Parfit’s argument is 
unfortunately intuitionist and alarmist. It just seems that we would “lose something” if 
“the normative” were to be “the natural.” His critics, in this collection and elsewhere, 
jump to the challenge: “oh, don’t worry,” they say “here is a way to see the normative as 
identical to the natural without the alarmist consequences.” And Parfit then replies, “ah, 
but you see, you do not see the normative as identical to the natural in every way imag-
inable; there is propositional distinctness after all.” And that is high meta-ethics today. 
How strange and misguided all this is! Why not take up the way in which the normative 
cannot be type-type identical with the natural to begin with? Therein lies the clue to the 
strangeness of the thought experiment. Interests guide us. Intending to bring some inter-
est or accomplishment-norm about, we shape various bits of the world in its light, or in 
the light of how we best understand the norm in question. (“Was that a clever sentence? 
Maybe not, let’s try it again.”) Parfit – and Copp – get the argument exactly backwards. 
It is not the “cognitive loss” that would follow from assimilating the normative to the 
natural that counts against the assimilation. It is rather that this assimilation reflects 
nothing less than a category mistake. It is like treating a modal concept as an empirical 
one. Of course there will be “cognitive loss” if we misdescribe the fundamental nature of 
a thing and then insist on staying faithful to that misdescription! But if we are easy going 
about the kind of identity there can be here, granting the logical possibility of type – type 
identity from the start, this point will be missed, or, perhaps more accurately, it will fail 
to guide the inquiry in the right way. 
As I say, part of what has gone wrong is a failure to appreciate how rich and varied the 
normative is, and how strange it would be if there were very much we could say about 
“the normative,” understood generally, that was both true and informative. And part of 
what has gone wrong is that a certain very important category, or subset, of the norma-
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tive just always fails to come up in these discussions. I very much doubt type – type iden-
tity between the normative and the natural would be so blithely assumed were the target 
cases of normative judgment under discussion to be drawn from the aesthetic context. 
(Just try it.) And the examples that do get attention, over and over again, are arguably 
not really cases of normative judgment in the first place. Perhaps my thought is more 
accurately expressed in saying it is wrong to put forward such examples as paradigms of 
the normative, and I believe this too, fixating on the wrong examples, also contributes 
to getting “the normative” wrong. I refer of course to the two ever present standbys in 
these discussions, “pain is bad” on one hand, “torturing people for fun is wrong” on the 
other. After a brief discussion of these two examples, and why it may be a mistake to 
think much can be learned about “the normative” from either of them, I will try to say a 
bit more about normative objectivity. 
Is “pain is bad” a normative statement? I am not sure it really is. At the least, it is a primi-
tive or degenerate case of such, since I do not think we are using the word “bad” in a 
context that employs any judgment. I think it is fair to say that when we say, when hurt, 
“that’s bad!” there is no judgment at all. “Bad,” here, is just a way saying how it feels when 
we are injured or damaged, what the qualia is like. It is a report, not an assessment or a 
judgment, and means simply “unpleasant” “better avoided” and so forth. By contrast, 
when I say “The Ambassadors is insightful” I am making a very different sort of claim 
entirely – here I do make a judgment, reach a verdict about an object I can pick out apart 
from that assessment. I refer to an accomplishment-kind, and also claim that this object 
bears it. It is assumed, rightly, that in offering this judgment, I am also prepared to of-
fer some sort of justification story. Similarly with respect to normative political claims. 
When I say “some redistribution of wealth is just” I offer a judgment that I am prepared 
to justify (in this case, perhaps by appealing to a reasonable conception of political equal-
ity). But by contrast, since I think we are simply reporting an unpleasant sensation when 
saying “pain is bad,” I am disinclined to call this an example of the normative. The bad-
ness of pain may be raw material for the normative, to be sure – and it is, famously, under 
utilitarianism. When utilitarians say we ought to bring about the best net aggregate of 
welfare, they are using the unpleasantness of pain as part of the raw material for their 
normative theory (the commitment to egalitarianism is the other central component). 
But the report of pain, or its so called “badness” is not normative at all. Just because we 
use the same word we might use when speaking of James Levine’s conducting (“Did you 
hear him last night? It was really bad.”) hardly means its use here expresses a “normative 
judgment.”
When Parfit says he cannot imagine how the claim “torturing people for fun is wrong” 
could in turn ever be wrong, he is quite right. But why is this? My own view is that there 
is a lot more mere semantic implication in this remark that is usually appreciated. Note, 
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we would never have in the simpler remark “torturing people is wrong” anything so 
unchallengeable. The smarty pants utilitarian might well imagine a case where tortur-
ing was justified (smarty pants Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld might too – indeed, 
might more than imagine it). By adding the “for fun” we already handle that worry – we 
pick out a certain sort of reason with “for fun,” essentially, a whimsical or trivial reason. 
And here “wrong” means, more or less, “not justified” or “not justifiable.” So, “torturing 
people for fun is wrong,” is, I think, very close to the following: causing harm must be 
justified, and if you cause harm for what is acknowledged not to be a good reason, then 
it follows, that cannot be justified. It is a platitude about the conceptual connection be-
tween harm and justification, not so far from something like “the innocent should never 
be punished” which expresses a platitude about the hoped for connection between how 
we understand “punishment” and “guilt.” It is not a normative judgment. It is certainly 
not a paradigmatic instance of one.     
Obviously, Parfit is a very formidable philosopher. The technical sophistication is daz-
zling, and, in his own way, he really is a better reader of his critics than many in me-
ta-ethics, more sympathetic and genuinely open to learning from those with whom he 
disagrees. The comparison with the better known expressivists in this regard goes very 
much in Parfit’s favor. But for all the sophistication, there is, in Parfit and in his critics, a 
surprising crudeness in the general treatment we get of the subject at hand. It is striking 
that a philosophical inquiry into “what matters” or “the normative” would be so indif-
ferent to the constructed world of art objects, and the complicated but very interesting 
judgments we make when within that world. Truthfully, there is not even very much 
attention to normative political judgments, and the degree to which they may, or may 
not, require a rich theory to be well justified. It is as if all the work, and controversy, 
surrounding Rawls’ late “pragmatic” defense of the liberal state had never occurred. Al-
though there is a lot of talk about “the normative” and “the natural,” to the extent this 
relationship is pursued at all in the context of a particular theory, a particular interpre-
tation, it is always utilitarianism. We never get any mention of say Marx, who actually 
thought very hard about how underlying material conditions might determine, or bear 
upon, the judgments of law and ideology we make when within a concrete world as mor-
al agents. It is, in short, so weird. There is the purported claim to be talking about what 
matters and the normative, and there is no sensitivity to what even a cursory inspection 
of this domain reveals. And then, connected to this, but a bit different, since I think it is 
also influenced by the infatuation with science we see in contemporary philosophy, there 
is this strange almost a priori commitment to essentialism, to the idea that there really 
is some single subject here with a single set of philosophical truths to be appended to it. 
And a certain amount of what is unsatisfactory follows simply from that.  One cannot 
help but ask: why must meta-ethicists be such essentialists? What is gained thereby? In 
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philosophy of mind, it is taken for granted that an analysis of beliefs and thoughts with 
propositional content on one hand, and an analysis of qualia on the other will probably 
not at all coincide. Why cannot we see a similar sensitivity to the rather obvious differ-
ences of terrain that characterize “the normative” or “what it is to have a reason”? Given 
this near a priori commitment to a unified subject matter, I do not think it is accidental 
that the examples we see over and over in these discussions are the anodyne “the badness 
of pain” and “the wrongness of torture for fun” – what are in fact merely reports of sensa-
tion and rehearsals of semantic connectedness, not cases of real normative judgment at 
all. If we were to have before us complex aesthetic judgments, or complex political judg-
ments, the way in which these judgments require far more than detection or inspection, 
and the way in which they are very different from one another, (by which I mean: their 
justification stories are very different in kind) would be obvious. 
So what does matter? Bits of the world matter to us in different ways, and for different 
reasons. It is not important that I find the state I live in to be “self expressive.” Instead, it 
simply needs to be a bit more than minimally just. By contrast, it is important that my 
writing, or teaching, reflect the particular things that I think – quite personally, or idio-
syncratically – are most worthwhile. The novels I respect and the music that I return to 
again and again must have certain qualities, but I do not think that “what SR respects” 
or “what SR returns to” on one hand and “what makes for a good novel” or “good music” 
are coextensive. Before some things – people, relationships, art objects, nature – it is hard 
to imagine such things “mattering” without also bringing in our emotional engagement, 
typically (but not always, as the case of nature shows) guided by judgment. In other 
cases, reference to a teleology does the trick. The state must advance certain ends, it must 
treat its citizens with equal concern and respect. That matters. But I see no need to posit 
some emotional engagement to the object of this thought. 
Philosophy currently stands at a very interesting and for some of us, exasperating, point. 
Its practitioners have never been more sophisticated, and philosophical writing has nev-
er been more subtle. At the same time, there is a strange lack of interest in, and so little 
exploration of, what there is in the world apart from philosophy that intrigues us, or 
puzzles us. So long as that remains so, works with titles like “On What Matters” will al-
ways be at least partially misleading. 
